and Justice in the Baltic Countries
When a Roman Catholic missionary, the priest-monk Vassiliy,
left Estonia for Russia in spring 1946, an Estonian peasant
said to him with a deep significance:
We are a so small country […], which wanted nothing from anybody
only asking to remain free »…
…« So, I ask you, when you see these free people,
tell them what we suffer here;
we were happy, free,
we never demanded anything from anybody
and now we are deprived of everything,
unable to make our voice heard… ».
I wish to consider my present paper only as a transmission of
the voice of this Estonian peasant, the Estonian consciousness,
history and the Estonian time, just to be able to hear this
voice in reality unheard until this day…
* * * *
I am here as a representative of the Autonomous Orthodox Church
of Estonia. I would like to present the situation in respect
to solidarity and justice in the Baltic countries and especially
As you know well, the Baltic States are independent now for
fourteen years. As you also know, before the collapse of the
Soviet Union they saw a long period of Soviet rule. The Baltic
Countries were part of the Soviet State in 1940-1941 and again
between 1944-1991. Especially in 1940, the State of Estonia,
recognised by Soviet Russia in 1920, was abolished. However,
after 1991, Russia has accepted the independence of the Baltic
countries on an international level. But this is not the case
with the Russian Orthodox Church.
The matter reminds us of the ancient Greek “Fable of the Big
People and the Little People”.
It is significant that religious communities deal with this
situation in different ways depending on their actual status.
On the one hand, if they are minorities in a different cultural
environment they outwardly preach tolerance and religious freedom,
while on the inside, they congregate the group members around
symbols and other particularities (“canonical territory”, antiquity
on the territory, exclusive and traditional sovereign rights,
and so on) in order to reduce the possibilities of desertion.
In fact, their purpose is to be given, by their members, an
anachronic power, in the traditional understanding of the word.
On the other hand, if they are relatively “dominant” within
a local society or in broader geographic formations, they disregard
the positions they would take if they were minorities, and instead
seek to impose upon all an objective which would be beneficial
to them, ignoring everything about tolerance, respect for others,
and the freedom of conscience. Of course, if these demands were
accepted, it would exclude from «the whole» those of different
culture, i.e. those who for various reasons have distanced themselves
from – or maintain only formal relations with – these communities.
As examples of these situations we can mention the position
of the Orthodox Church of Greece, which ideologically insists
that being Greek can be identified with being Orthodox, or the
case of Catholicism in the European Union, which alleges that
Christian identity must be considered a constitutive element
of European identity, despite the fact that a «re-evangelisation»
had to be started in the 1990s, or even the case of the Orthodox
Church in Russia, who seeks to restore the sovereign rights
it held during the time of the tsars. Through these claims,
religious organs seek to once again become constitutive elements
of the public sector and to reclaim the possibility of intervening
institutionally within it. Put more simply, they reminisce about
old glories and seek to gain a share of power. In such cases,
the fictive argument of defending the rights of a «majority»
group is used, though it does not correspond, indeed, to reality.
Most important of all, though, is that if these claims were
satisfied, it would constitute a violation of human freedom
and of the human right of self-determination.
An important question relating to our issue is whether the declaration
of human rights is broad enough to ensure the recognition of
every kind of rights, or, if it is not, whether it is necessary
to institutionalise or recognise certain collective or group
rights. On the one hand, human rights encompass individual and
collective rights, and imply the obligation to respect them.
On the other hand, the recognition of collective or group rights
can present some dangers. To be sure, there are no general formulas
for these issues; they need to be examined on a case-by-case
basis. However, group rights can bring about a grave danger.
By claiming to speak for a specific group, under the pretence
of acting in the group’s best interests, and using the protection
of the group’s rights as justification, someone could attempt
to secure for themselves a leading position within the group.
The Russian Orthodox Church provides a characteristic example:
she demands the recognition of her traditional sovereign rights
over the Russian people, even pretending to represent the will
of that people, without the corresponding consent of the latter.
In this way she seeks to bring back pre-modern structures and
conceptions. In expressing this demand, she uses the concept
of «multipolarity» instead of multiculturality, either on
the political level, or on the panorthodox one. Of course, there
is a large gap between the meanings of these two notions. Multiculturality
expresses the existence of cultural plurality in our current
societies. On the contrary, the concept of «multipolarity» has
recently been used in the domain of geopolitics to express the
need for the recognition of the existence of different poles
of power on a global level, thus avoiding the single/unique
pole of power held by the USA. The Russian Orthodox Church adopts
the same concept within the ecclesiastical domain: she wishes
the recognition of the existence of different poles of ecclesiastical
authority on a global level, thus avoiding the single/unique
pole of authority held by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople,
and specifically as well as Primus inter pares (First among
equals). Consequently, by using the term «multipolarity», the
Russian Orthodox Church affirms that she respects «the rights
of other people», as long as her own «sovereign rights» over
the regions where she exercises ecclesiastical jurisdiction
through a Russian concept as well as over the Russian people
and the regions they inhabit, are recognised (see infra). In
fact, in this way, she lays claim to the representation of a
people by enforcing a traditional religious “leadership” that
uncontrollably wants to impose its views upon all.
* * * *
Let us further examine this issue from two perspectives: the
ecclesiastical and the political.
A. The ecclesiastical level
Since the further object of this meeting is Solidarity and Justice,
it would be constructive to carry out a comparative study through
examples. Such will show that contemporary orthodox ecclesiology
is an ecclesiology with stratifications and symmetrical deviations,
revealed not only in orthodox ecclesiological practice across
the world today, but also in the statutory practice of the National
Orthodox Churches, as we shall see immediately below. Just one
double example of statutory dispositions with non-ecclesiological
content suffices to highlight the enormity of the existing ecclesiastical
problem. To this end, it would be useful to recall just one
article from the Statutory Charters of a hellenophone and of
a slavophone Church, i.e. the Statutory Charter of the Church
of Cyprus and the Statutory Charter of the Church of Russia,
in order to put them in the perspective of our problematic.
«Members of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus are:
all Cypriot Orthodox Christians, who have become members of
the Church through baptism and who are permanent residents of
Cyprus, as well as
all those of Cypriot origin, who are currently residing abroad»
(Article 2, Statutes of the Autocephalous Church of Cyprus-1980).
«The jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church extends to:
people of Orthodox confession residing in the USSR ; living
on the canonical territory of the Russian Orthodox Church ,
as well as
people who reside other countries and who voluntarily accept
her jurisdiction» (Article I, § 3, Statutes of the Church of
Russia-1988 and 2000).
These articles are representative of Statutory Charters with
three main and common non-ecclesiological properties:
The jurisdiction of these Churches extends itself, deliberately
and principally, to people and not exclusively to territories.
In other words and without further analysis, the exertion of
ecclesiological jurisdiction on people simply means that this
single statutory fact gives these Churches the right to penetrate,
by definition, into the canonical bounds of other locally established
Churches… While we all know that Autocephaly, according to Pauline
Ecclesiology, is granted on a given location, to a territory
with explicit boundaries and on purely geographic criteria –
nowadays usually geo-state – and not to a nation. So the notion
of Autocephaly is essentially that found in New Testament ecclesiology,
in contrast to the Old Testament insofar as the latter identifies
the chosen people with the Nation. Consequently, the jurisdiction
of a locally established Autocephalous Church is exerted on
a specific territory and never on an entire nation, much less
on scattered people. On “people” therefore, and not on “canonical
territory”, which a Church invokes only in self-defence against
“intruders” who, conforming to their Statutory Charter, plan
to instate an exterior (hyperoria) co-territoriality on its
“canonical territory”. This is done to prevent external ecclesiastical
interventions on its own ecclesial territory on the part of
some other jurisdiction (or some other “confession”) acting
according to the same principles, since this Church itself statutorily
practices such ecclesiastic interventionism on the canonical
territory of other Churches.
The Churches in question statutorily declare that they are unwilling,
for any reason, to limit the exertion of their jurisdiction
to territories situated within their canonical boundaries (as
they should ecclesiologically since, not only are they both
locally established Churches, but also because of the principle
of Autocephaly, which determines their ecclesiological and institutional
existence, demands it), and insist on expanding beyond their
canonical boundaries, since their Statutory Charters gives them
this right. In ecclesiological practice, this is called institutional
interference and, most of all, institutional and statutory confirmation
of co-territoriality. In other words, this is an institutional
ecclesiastic attempt to reinforce co-territoriality within ecclesiology.
Most importantly, these Churches, when referring to territories
outside their boundaries, knowingly and purposely make no distinction
between territories plainly of the “Diaspora” and principal
“canonical territories” of other locally established Churches.
By extension, this particular statutory reference to people
obliterates the elementary canonical distinction of “canonical
territories” and “territories of the Diaspora”, thus creating
not only the definition of internal co-territoriality – this
time founded on a statutory base with the consequences of multilateral
hyperoria multi-jurisdiction – but also another anti-ecclesiological
phenomenon and characteristic: the notion and practice of global
ethno-ecclesial jurisdiction. This newly formed idiom starts
founding a global Ecclesiology, limited to a national(ist) level
this time, or, better yet, brings about the formation of numerous
global orthodox national Ecclesiologies.
Consequently, the Statutory Charters of the Churches of Cyprus
and Russia introduce a dual ecclesiological-canonical system
for the exertion of their ecclesiastic jurisdiction, a system
which bears, ecclesiologically speaking, on in inherent contradiction:
Internally, within the boundaries of the body of the locally
established Church, they ecclesiologically exhibit “canonical
territory”, i.e. territoriality and mono-jurisdiction.
Externally, outside the boundaries of the body of the locally
established Church, they statutorily claim “hyperoria jurisdiction”,
i.e. co-territoriality and multi-jurisdiction.
This fact in itself, by definition, constitutes a corruption
and an alteration of the Ecclesiology of the Church and, in
two words, causes an ecclesiastical case with full of canonical
contradictions and ecclegiological difficulties, or, if I may,
an ecclesiological hotchpotch… In fact, a National Church cannot
exercise ecclesiastical dominated rights within the territory
of another state – unless it is asked to do so –, that is different
than the one in which she exists. This is because the principle
of the Autocephaly presupposes as a condition of constitution
of an Autocephalous Church the exercise of ecclesiastical jurisdiction
within the boundaries of the state of which she has the geo-ethnic
name. Even more so when within the other state exists a locally
(indigenous) established Autocephalous or Autonomous Church.
Because of this persistent ecclesiological problem which nowadays
increases more and more, our opinion is that when a National
Church behaves in such a way and exercises ecclesiological imperialism,
her Autocephalous rights have to be conciliarily revoked temporarily
due to abusive behaviour and due principally to the causing
of ecclesiological confusion among the locally established Churches.
B. The political level
There exists a problem between the Churches in the Baltic countries
with the Russian Orthodox Church on a political level, too,
especially in the domain of international public law. Clause
3 of the Statutes of the Russian Orthodox Church states that:
jurisdiction of the Russian Orthodox Church shall include persons
of Orthodox confession living on the canonical territory of
the Russian Orthodox Church in Russia, Ukraine, Byelorussia,
Moldavia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Tajikistan, Turkmenia, Uzbekistan and Estonia, and also Orthodox
Christians living in other countries and voluntarily joining
this jurisdiction» (Article I, § 3, Statutes of the Russian
As we see, Estonia is not an independent State, but part of
the “canonical territory” of the Russian Orthodox Church. That
means that other Orthodox Churches beside her do not exist and
do not have right to exist there any more. Through this position
we can understand the problem we have concerning justice, as
the Russian Orthodox Church does not recognise as a religious
entity any other Orthodox Churches and, by extension, Catholic
nor Protestant Churches in this region. All these Churches exist
on a Russian “canonical territory”. Also, it is a problem from
the point of view of the international public law, as these
Russian Statutes do not recognise Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania
as independent States, because they constitute part of “all
Russias” of the ecclesiastical domain. In other words, the Russian
Orthodox Church does not recognise the independence and self-government
of these States as the Russian State do. And this is recorded
within her Constitution. In this case, how it is possible to
have a National and Autocephalous Church which declares the
territories of different independent States as her “canonical
territory” and uses official constitutional Statutes to revendicate
these territories and to refuse at the same time the existence
of the other indigenous homodox Churches?
The result of this problematic position is very negative on
the level of solidarity and justice as well as on the practical
The reactivation of the Autonomy of the Orthodox Church of Estonia
in 1996 resulted in a temporary break of communion between the
Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Russian Orthodox Church. It
was solved by the Zurich agreement on April 22, 1996, by which
the existence of the Autonomous Orthodox Church of Estonia as
well as the diocese of the Russian Orthodox Church in Estonia
were recognised. The Russian Orthodox Church, however, has never
applied this agreement. This is why I remembered the fable about
the Big People and Little People – the big ones may disregard
any agreements. As the Autonomous Church of Estonia does not
exist for the Russian Orthodox Church, the agreement counts
The Orthodox Church of Estonia exists as an Autonomous Church
since 1923 and her Tomos of Autonomy was reactivated by the
Ecumenical Patriarchate after the Soviet parenthesis, again,
in February 1996. So, until now, for almost ten years, the Russian
Orthodox Church does not recognise us according to her Statutes,
because Estonia is regarded as her cultural “canonical territory”.
However, the small countries and “little people” have a right
to exist in their countries and consequently the right of the
indigenous population must be acknowledged. The Autonomous Orthodox
Church of Estonia does recognise the diocese of the Moscow Patriarchate
in Estonia and maintains the justice vis-à-vis that diocese,
but in return we do not receive a similar treatment. So, the
dialogue between these two ecclesiastical entities does not
exist. We wish to have this dialogue so much, but the Russian
diocese constantly refuses, because we do not exist… However
it is a demand for dialogue between “Sister Churches”, between
Orthodox “Sister Churches”, and between brothers of the same
Church. In fact this refusing is the total confirmation of the
fable of “the big and the little”…
The problem does not stop there. The Russian Orthodox Church
has blocked the participation of the Autonomous Church of Estonia
and any relations with her in international ecclesiastical institutions
as well as KEK, WCC and other ecclesiastical and political organisations.
All these organisations know that we are “little” and not “big”…
It must not be forgotten that before 1940s, 25 % of the population
of Estonia or some 230,000 belonged to the Orthodox Church,
and now only some 25,000, i.e. 2,9 %, are left (1/10 !). Here
we have a question about solidarity and justice for the conscience
of History and the conscience of human society, if these consciences
* * * *
The question that has already arisen concerning the situation
of the Baltic States and especially the Baltic Churches vis-à-vis
the Russian Orthodox Church is this: What is it that expresses
the Church’s consciousness of herself? What also is it that
expresses the society’s consciousness of itself?
It often happens in History that the osmosis of actual conditions
and human aspirations obliges us to ask ourselves about the
nature of the ideal on the one hand and the practicable on the
other, and about the limits of each. To what extent does the
absolutism of the ideal drive us to escape from History, and
to what extent does idolising the attainable lead to a life
without meaning? In the best case, both those who make some
compromise and their successors do have the necessary realism
to act within particular historical contexts, but also have
the invaluable awareness that they have deviated from what they
themselves have accepted as an ideal. In the worst case, this
awareness is lacking, with the result that every choice is made
into an absolute, every action is justified ipso facto, and
there is a refusal to submit choices or actions to the test
of ecclesial criteria and sometimes to the test of human rights
criteria. Our degree of proximity to the best or worst case
indicates the degree to which that blessing called the critical
faculty – our capacity to look critically at the course of life
even as we are in the midst of it – is bearing fruit or withering.
In her effort to realise her churchliness, also on the socio-political
level, a Church sometimes falls away from the invariable ecclesial
teaching and practice and does not accord totally with that.
In this case, it is better and much more honest to declare:
“Church for us is only a socio-political Body and not the Body
of Christ”. For many contemporary churchmen, this declassification
would have a liberating effect: all the difficulties and contradictions
would automatically become less important, because they would
no longer relate to the eschatological character of the Church
and hence be binding on the Church’s consciousness. This declassification
is indeed legitimate in itself; it is not, however, legitimate
to use it as a way to evade the questions that have been raised.
If it is discovered after the fact that, unbeknown to us, the
gun we were firing at someone was empty, this establishes that
commission of murder was precluded from the beginning; but it
does not answer any of the questions related to pulling the
Highlighting these issues does not mean that we are demanding
answers to hypothetical questions; for many of the conjectures
about how differently History might have turned out, there is
not even an answer. But what we can do with these questions
is to try to throw some light on the ways in which the Church’s
self-awareness is formed and progresses within History. The
main thing, in our view, is not that we should never lose our
way, but that we should never lose our compass….
The question, then, that should trouble us in response to these
positions is the same one we posed previously, only in different
words. So what is the answer? What is tragic for the self-awareness
of the Church, and for her freedom to submit everything to the
test of her unshakeable theological criteria, is the fact that
the fate of the Russian Orthodox Church is repeated in the case
of some contemporary Statutes: National Churches who (doubtless
with the best of intentions), in order to demonstrate their
abhorrence of anything they regard as an attempt to distinguish
essential from inessential or to add or subtract anything to
or from the God-given deposit, trumpet their faithfulness to
the Ecclesiastical Tradition. By contrast, an indication of
a sensitive theological attitude is the stance taken by the
Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople. Yet the inspiration
of the Canons by the Ecumenical Patriarchate did not ultimately
drag her down the path of ecclesiastical conformism. In collaboration
with the Church of Russia, the Ecumenical Patriarchate took
part in a critical appraisal to seek out the essential. The
reason for this, however, seems to us both clear and significant.
To their consciousness, attuned as it was to the Church’s self-awareness,
it was patently obvious that this was in truth… They are able
to do this, it seems to us, not only because they never take
their eyes off History, but precisely because of their intention
to focus not on every detail, but specifically on the criteria
of their ecclesial faith. This intention, unfailingly coupled
with discernment, is the ‘valve’ preventing the invaluable critical
view from slipping into a realm of arbitrary subjectivism.
I think, however, that this is not the only point being made
here. I have the impression that in referring to the Ecclesial
and Canonical Tradition, we are aiming obliquely at restricting
the use of force by the Church, even that indirect and necessary
force which we have outlined.
* * * *
Through this often labyrinthine interweaving of historical conditions,
the formulation of interpretations, it is possible to make out
an unceasing effort to remain faithful to the Church’s criteria,
an effort not always totally successful, but still has to be
endeavoured because we are human.
According to the “axioms” formulated by the Canonical Tradition
as to the way the sacred Canons are composed and function:
«Any acts that are rare, a matter of economy, a result of constraint
or of some evil custom or, simply put, contrary to the Canons,
are not to be taken as a law, canon or example for the Church...
Rather, once the economy or the constraint is past, the Canons
are once again in force. Anything that is wrongly decided and
printed cannot be confirmed by canon or law or time or custom...».
axioms, which are obviously a distillation of the Church’s consciousness,
experience and perspective on the canons, are set out epigrammatically
without further theoretical probing and examination, but they
succeed nevertheless in pointing to an important obligation:
the duty to approach the ‘mind’ of the Canons, to ascertain
the historical matrix of each one and to distinguish between
what is temporary and what is enduring in the life of the Church.
If the scholar wants to accept the challenge offered by the
Canonical Tradition and penetrate more deeply into this logic,
he will be called to see that the distinction made by the axioms
just laid out is not between, on the one hand, arrangements
connected with History («rare, a matter of economy, a result
of constraint or of some evil custom»), and on the other hand
those that are timeless, untrammelled by History and its constraints
(«law, canon and example for the Church»). For the Church, History
is not a fall, but rather something that has been assumed by
the Logos-Word, the field in which divine economy is active
and humanity responds. Nothing that the Church does or creates
is unhistorical. The distinction lies, then, between two historicities:
between regulations relating to the normal course of events,
and those relating to extraordinary circumstances. The task
of both is to give a clear orientation to the People of God
(which ceaselessly journeys through History, often encountering
unforeseen territories), and to serve to establish that pace
which will help the People progress as a Body, rather than being
dismembered into various private pathways. Sensitivity in pinpointing
what is ‘rare’, ‘a matter of economy’, ‘resulting from constraint’,
etc., is invaluable, not in order to show History as something
negative, but precisely in order to make us realise that if
the particular historical conditions of the various arrangements
(the temporal element) are ignored or played down, the clarity
of the orientation (the enduring) is thrown into question. The
Canons ‘are in force’ when the extraordinary circumstances no
longer apply, not because we are then restored to a historical
vacuum, but because we are returning to what is normal and expected
* * * *
The ecclesiastical practice tried to show that the restriction
of freedom – even when it appears to be inevitable – is a temporary,
transient element in the life of the Church. The correspondence
between historical reality on the one hand and ecclesiastical
arrangements on the other is really of vital importance (since
the adjustments made on various occasions have the aim of ensuring
that the Church is properly orientated in time and space). To
what extent, and under what conditions, is it possible for our
hermeneutic to degenerate into a matrix for ideologies – mental
constructs which are fabricated in the absence of any reality
and are, furthermore, unable to understand that they are divorced
from reality? In other words, is there a hidden danger of nurturing
a false consciousness, a consciousness that fails to correspond
to what actually is?
First of all, such lack of information and having no way of
knowing the actual circumstances obviously cannot be blamed.
Such a lack of information may be culpable also if it is the
result of a particular theological attitude (cf. the choice
of the Russian Orthodox Church) – an indifference to History
on principle, or a conviction that the Church’s pronouncements
bear no relation to historical circumstances. This sort of attitude
corresponds to the type of ideological false consciousness according
to which – to borrow Mannheim’s typology – the subject is truly
and genuinely unable to see the discrepancy between his ideas
and reality, precisely because the whole makeup of his way of
thinking precludes the discovery of this discrepancy.
Questions particularly troubling to the Church’s self-consciousness
arise later on, once the historical mosaic has been reconstructed.
What attitude should the Church member take when it becomes
apparent that what we had accepted as the historical basis for
our conclusions is not in fact the case? This question confronts
us, as we have already seen, from the moment we discover that
in the Baltic Area the real situation is different from that
which we gather from the Fifty years parenthesis (1940/44-1991).
This question is not raised – far from it! – in order to pass
judgement on the churchmen before us who became the cause for
this situation, or in order to guess what they would have said
if they were alive today, but in order to invite us to think
about the way in which our present ecclesial consciousness deals
So it seems to us that there are two possibilities, without
a definitive solution. Either prepare the way for a solution
that takes into full consideration the actual, that is, post
1991, socio-political reality in Estonia as well as in Baltic
Countries. This would entail that the “big man” (of our fable)
calmly accept the ‘new universe’ unfolding before him, without
panicking at the change in his familiar world, and launch into
a creative work of encounter between the criteria of his faith
and the new reality. The other possibility is that the “big
man” may develop a consciousness that has characteristically
been called “pharisaical”. This means that, although he
has the possibility of discovering the discrepancy between his
ideas and this actual socio-political reality, yet he draws
a veil over his eyes.
In real life, of course, it is doubtful how far these possible
reactions manifest themselves in a clear-cut and unalloyed form.
What matters, however, is the readiness to meet the reality
that obtains at any given time, an attitude that takes as its
model the very Incarnation of the Word in the actual conditions
of the world, and in the present in which man lives at any given
period of History. The historian John Lukacs has expressed a
view that could be characterised as creatively optimistic in
its blunt realism:
«Contrary to the ‘scientific’ illusion, in the research and
the writing of History there are no final results. And the purpose
of History is often not so much the definite accounting of the
events of a period as it is the historical description and understanding
of problems... – because while a perfect completion of our knowledge
of the past is not possible, a reasonable and proper understanding
of it is within our powers».
seems to be a dynamism of this sort that inspired the perspective
of the questions in the large area of Baltic.
If I may repeat myself, let me state once again this proverbial
expression: the main thing is not that we should never lose
our way, but that we should never lose our compass…
Hdr. Archim. Grigorios D. Papathomas Vienna, 26.11.2005
of “Saint Platon” Orthodox Seminary of Theology, Tallinn
See the same texte “Solidaarsusest ja Õiglusest Baltimaade shutes
(Solidarity and Justice in the Baltic Countries)”, in Usk ja
Elu, t. 1 (1/2006), p. 43-57 (in Estonian).
See Archim. Grigorios D. Papathomas-R. P. Matthias H. Palli
(sous la direction de), The Autonomous Orthodox Church of Estonia/L’Église
autonome orthodoxe d’Estonie (Approche historique et nomocanonique),
Thessaloniki-Katerini, “Epektasis” Publications (series: Nomocanonical
Library, n° 11), 2002, p. 13 and 15.
See Vassily (Hieromonk [Charles Bourgeois, s. j.]), Ma rencontre
avec la Russie (Narva-Esna-Tartu-Moscou) 1932-1946, Buenos Aires
1953, p. 101 and 146 and the following).
Treaty of Tartu (2nth of February 1920) ; see Archim. Grigorios
D. Papathomas-R. P. Matthias H. Palli, The Autonomous Orthodox
Church of Estonia…, op. cit., p. 281.
See J. S. Petrou, Multiculturality and Religious Freedom, Thessaloniki,
ed. Paratiritis, 2003, p. 42-43 (in Greek).
See again ibid., p. 24-25.
See our article entitled “The oppositional relationship between
the locally established Church and the ecclesiastical ‘Diaspora’
(Ecclesiological unity faced against ‘co-territoriality’ and
‘multi-jurisdiction’)”, in Synaxis, vol. 90 (4-6/2004), p. 37-38
(in Greek). Also, “The oppositional relationship between the
locally established Church and the ecclesiastical ‘Diaspora’
(Ecclesiological unity faced against ‘co-territoriality’ and
‘multi-jurisdiction’)”, in L’Année canonique [Paris], t. 46
(2004), p. 88-89, in Contacts, t. 57, n° 210 (4-6/2005), p.
111-113, in Ast. Argyriou (Textes réunis par), Chemins de la
Christologie orthodoxe, Paris, Desclée (coll. Jésus et Jésus-Christ,
n° 91), 2005, XX, p. 362-364, and in Archim. Grigorios D. Papathomas,
Essays on Orthodox Canon Law, Florence, Università degli Studi
di Firenze Facoltà di Scienze Politiche “Cesare Alfieri” (coll.
“Seminario di Storia delle istituzioni religiose e relazioni
tra Stato e Chiesa-Reprint Series”, n° 38), 2005, chap. II,
p. 36/12-37/13 (in French).
See especially the Canons of the Church: 14 of Apostles (2nth-3rd
centuries), 15 of the Ist Ecumenical Council (325), 11 of the
Local Council of Sardica (343), 2 of the IInth Ecumenical Council
(381), 5 and 12 of the IVth Ecumenical Council (451).
For the approach which follows, we have used as primary text
of inspiration the trilingual very interesting book of Ath.
N. Papathanasiou, Canons and Freedom, Thessaloniki-Katerini,
“Epektasis” Publications (series: Nomocanonical Library, n°
15), 2005, 185 p. ; mainly p. 102 (p. 46 [in Greek] and p. 159
[in French]) and ss.
Ibid, p. 103-105 (p. 46-48 [in Greek] and p. 159-161 [in French]).
Ibid, p. 105 (p. 48 [in Greek] and p. 161-162 [in French]).
Pidalion, (The Rudder), p. xix, note, §§ 9 and 14.
See Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the
Sociology of Knowledge (trad. Louis Wirth and Edward Shils,
London, ed. Routledge and Kegan Paul, no date, p. 175-176. Mannheim’s
three types of ideological distortion have to do specifically
with the ‘defection’ of historical activity from the ideology
which would normally determine it. They do, however, throw light
on the broader question of how a false consciousness is formed.
See also p. 84-86 and 94 ; cited by Ath. N. Papathanasiou, Canons
and Freedom…, op. cit., p. 123 (p. 67 [in Greek] and p. 179-180
Cf. Mannheim’s ‘cant mentality’…, op. cit., p. 176.
John Lukacs, The Hitler of History, New York, ed. Alfred A.
Knopf, 1997, p. xii ; cited by Ath. N. Papathanasiou, Canons
and Freedom…, op. cit., p. 125 (p. 69 [in Greek] and p. 181
Ibid, p. 105 (p. 48 [in Greek] and p. 161-162 [in French]).